


↳ Lecture 1

Why Bayesian Statistics?

one way of seeing it...

- After staring at the same spot for 4 weeks, your telescope comes up with the following spectrum:




What is it?

↑ Chandra energy channels + "true energy" → redshift

since we have no idea what it is, let's ask a statistician

→ ask a Frequentist:




→ what is this?

F: which physical model produced that data?

$L(O|M(\theta))$: probability of getting the data for a model M
 ↑
 some parameters

→ if I gave the frequentist the model, he would tell me the constraints on its parameters
 → but I don't have the model

- Just to illustrate... let's agree to invent some completely unmotivated model



→ 6 parameters → it will fit somehow


→ Frequentist: $L(D|M(\theta))$ maximieren → fitting, best fit parameters

• histogram:



• at this point the Frequentist will ask for new data
 ... which you can't give him (your colleagues have the telescope for 4 weeks...)

⇒ Frequentist will complain: Look Frequentist statistics works like this:



estimators: $\mu(p) = \frac{1}{N} \sum_i p_i$

$$\text{Var}(p) = \frac{1}{N-1} \sum_i (p_i - \mu)^2$$

good and unbiased estimators for $N \rightarrow \infty$

but for $N=1, \dots$?

so he wants to have the sampling step the error on the parameters



→ partition available data set into subdata sets, repeat analysis ... (is this bootstrap or jackknife?)

⇒ say you had 30 energy channels

⇒ partition into 3×10 subdata sets



⇒ note: error: not σ as with this histogram, we don't know whether it is Gaussian

→ this allows to assess by how much your estimates jump around.

but this procedure has to stop when the number of data points in subset = number of parameters

⇒ you quickly get stuck with frequentist statistics, because:

- you don't know the model
- speaking about "frequencies" is a strong, strong euphemism: $3 \ll \infty$
 ⇒ousy averaging ⇒ strong biases

Frequentist inference:

at some point, for large N , the distribution



→ the maximum doesn't move around

→ the shape doesn't change

} "significantly"

when more measurements are added

⇒ it has converged to the "true" distribution

→ could resample it to get



⇒ $\hat{\rho}$ is the "true" value in the sense, "I have measured $\hat{\rho}$ 10^{many} times, I always find $\hat{\rho} \pm \text{error}$, if I measure once more, I think I will again measure $\hat{\rho} \pm \text{an error which I understand}$ "

Bayesian inference

• I don't have enough data / I don't want to have enough data to talk about "frequencies"

→ nuclear reactor accidents + epidemiology:
you really don't want to remeasure...

⇒ yet it is clear there is a causal connection between things

⇒ rely on your general understanding and use physics to come up with a credible argumentation line

→ take your data as fixed and assess ~~not the~~ "probability" not as "frequency" but as "credibility" instead

• if you don't know the model ⇒ come up with multiple physically motivated models
→ admit that credibility does not only come from good data, but can also stem from an "extremely powerful theory"

= "a theory that explains a lot"

⇒ Priors

→ which one is the best model?

⇒ Evidence

↓
"most natural explanation"

• mathematically:

Frequentist: $L(\vec{x} | \vec{\theta}(M)) \Rightarrow$ Likelihood of getting the data \vec{x} ,
for some value of the parameters $\vec{\theta}$,
which belong to the Model M

Bayesian: Data \vec{x} are given $\Rightarrow P(\vec{\theta}(M) | \vec{x})$ • Bayes theorem here

$L(\vec{x} | \vec{\theta}(M))$ and $P(\vec{\theta}(M) | \vec{x})$ are related by Bayes theorem:


$$P(\vec{\theta}(M) | \vec{x}) = \frac{L(\vec{x} | \vec{\theta}(M)) \overbrace{p(\vec{\theta}(M))}^{\text{Prior}}}{\underbrace{E_{\vec{\theta}(M)}(L(\vec{x} | \vec{\theta}(M)))}_{\text{Evidence = marginal likelihood}}}$$

↓
"Posterior"


Here, with the notation $Q(M)$, we mean that the quantity Q is evaluated
in the framework of the chosen Model M

- $\rightarrow M$ could be:
- the standard model of cosmology
 - the Torokado-theory or any other crazy stuff about which people always write me Emails at my outreach adress

• In our case: Come up with 2 Models
decaying dark matter



↑ whole spectrum is integrated over z , the redshift



$z \in [0, 2]$, some concretely located thing

could be iron-k line

\rightarrow ad hoc ① and ② are equally crazy (iron-k, excuse me...)

= "equally likely"

\Rightarrow Let's Bayes it

Parameters:

1) modelling decaying dark matter : $p_1 = E_d$ Energy of decay radiation
 $p_2 = \sigma_d$ width of the decay spectrum

modelling cosmic γ -ray background: $p_3 = S$, some spectral tilt
 $p_4 = A$, some Amplitude

modelling cosmic rays: $p_5 = E_r$, mean energy of rays
 $p_6 = \sigma_r$, width of CR-peak

$$\Rightarrow \vec{\Theta} = (E_d, \sigma_d, S, A, E_r, \sigma_r)$$

2) Energy of iron lines are known from earth laboratories \Rightarrow no parameters

- parameters,
- cosmic redshift z
 - amount of iron/metallicity Z
 - temperature T

$$\vec{\Theta} = (z, Z, T)$$

Likelihoods: clear ✓

↳ what is this prior and Evidence stuff?

Priors

- Yes, one can fool oneself with priors, if one isn't careful.
- Yes, there are well motivated priors, that don't fool you.

→ where there is nothing to discuss about priors: Data driven priors

- prior = likelihood from previous measurements
- Likelihood = new statistical power from new data set
- ⇒ posterior = more sharply peaked because in total you have now more data



→ where there is something to discuss about priors: Theory-driven priors
(my use of the word "prior")


$$P(\theta(\mu) | \bar{x}) = \frac{L(\bar{x} | \theta(\mu)) \cdot p(\theta(\mu))}{\int L(\bar{x} | \mu) p(\theta(\mu)) d\theta(\mu)}$$

all data
additional theoretical knowledge


- Examples:
- upper/lower bounds of a parameter
 - distributions of nuisance parameters

Fun with priors + how to fool yourself

— Likelihood
..... Prior





cutting away unphysical values




"Gaussianizing" a posterior




theory and observation at mismatch



using data twice




→



→ whatever you do: state your priors explicitly!

Don't decide on theoretical priors after the arrival of data!

Typical examples of priors in Bayesian cosmology:



→ why does Λ have the value it has?

- assume your data set depends on some parameters $\vec{\Theta}$, which you want to know, and a nuisance parameter p_n

⊙ e.g. per mass conservation

→ maybe you have some understanding of the nuisance?

E.g.: p_n comes from a fluctuating quantity $\Rightarrow p_n$ has mean zero

- maybe it is additionally known to be Gauss distributed, with unknown σ :

$$p_n \sim \mathcal{N} \exp \left(-\frac{1}{2} \frac{p_n^2}{\sigma^2} \right)$$

→ prior \Rightarrow marginalize out σ

- the width of the prior Δp , in comparison to your measurement errors of a parameter ($p_i \pm \Delta p_i$) will decide whether you consider your parameter measured.

$$\frac{\Delta p_i}{\Delta p} \gg 1 \text{ order } \sim 1: \text{parameter not measured}$$

$$\frac{\Delta p_i}{\Delta p} \ll 1: \text{parameter measured}$$